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NOTE
CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT: INFORMED
OR MISINFORMED?
Patients undergoing medical treatment face numerous decisions seriously af-
fecting their lives. The doctrine of informed consent developed in response to
the patient's need for adequate information in the health care decisionmaking
process. This Note traces the development of the informed consent doctrine.
The various standards of disclosure that have emerged are analyzed. In addi-
tion, the impact of informed consent is discussed in light of the emerging con-
sent issues with critically and terminally ill patients.
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INTRODUCTION
Informed consent' or misinformed consent - the debate rages as
to which represents the true state of the decision-making process in
1. The Minnesota informed consent statute is codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 144.651, subd. 9 (1984).
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today's medical world.2 Physicians often proclaim that the average
patient knows little about medicine.-" Their duty, prescribed by the
Hippocratic oath,4 demands that a physician offer his efforts in treat-
ment and do his patient no harm. In contrast, lawyers focus on the
issue of rights,5 a term in a constant state of evolution. According to
lawyers, a preoccupation with the quality of health care must give
way to the value of patient freedom and autonomy. The doctrine of
informed consent attempts to merge these divergent stances. In so
doing, it defines the parameters in medicine 6 and the concurrent
2. See J. LUDLAM, INFORMEI) CONSENT 9 (1978); F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT A PRACTICAl. GUIDE 2 (1984); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Con-
sent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing lues i i Medical Decisionmaking, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 413; Schwartz & Grubb, Il'hv Britain Can"t Afford Informed Consent, 15 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 19 (Aug. 1985); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy,
64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970).
3. See 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR TIlE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS 1-3 (1982)[hereinafter cited as 3 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
4. Historically, physician skepticism regarding patients' potential for autono-
mous decisionmaking is traceable to the era of Hippocrates.
Perform [these duties] calmly and adroitly, concealing most things from the
patient while you are attending to him. Give necessary orders with cheerful-
ness and sincerity, turning his attention away from what is being done to
him, sometimes reprove sharply and emphatically, and sometimes comfort
with solicitude and attention, revealing nothing of the patient's future or
present condition.
Hippocrates, Decorum, in HIPPOCRATES (W.H.S.Jones trans. 2d ed. 1967), quoted in 1
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 32 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
5. 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 24.
6. Many cases have dealt with the issue of informed consent. See, e.g.. Hender-
son v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying objective standard of
disclosure); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting ob-
jective standard for disclosure of risks); Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.
Ark.), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976) (physician failed to adhere to community
standard by assuming referring physician had obtained informed consent); Roberts v.
Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 582 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (no liability in failing to obtain in-
formed consent when patient's emotional state made disclosure detrimental); Poulin
v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 256 (Alaska 1975) (failure to inform of risks dismissed for
lack of causation); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 299, 302, 502 P.2d 1, 6, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 509 (1972) (court applies objective standard inquiring whether risk is material
to patient's decision); Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 288, 611 P.2d 902, 906,
165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (1980) (physician liable for failing to disclose risks which
would have changed a prudent person's decision to undergo treatment); Salgo v.
Leland StanfordJr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 564, 317 P.2d 170,
175 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (physician discretion to withhold information); Bloskas
v. Murray, 618 P.2d 719, 722 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (adopting standard of what rea-
sonable medical practitioner in community would disclose); Coleman v. Garrison,
327 A.2d 757, 760 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (applying profes-
sional community standard of disclosure); Meretsky v. Ellenby, 370 So. 2d 1222,
1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (applying professional community standard of disclo-
1171.I.11. .11rl'ClIEl. 1-111' REITEIV
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Patients requiring medical treatment must cope with a perplexing
medical world. Patients are thrust into foreign environments and re-
quired to make decisions that will seriously affect their lives. In-
formed consent developed in response to patients' need to make
knowing and intelligent decisions about medical treatment. 8
The doctrine of informed consent requires that a patient be given
all pertinent information which will enable him to make the decision
to undergo!) or forego10 a specified medical treatment. The consent
cannot be legally effective unless the patient's decision is intelligently
made, based on adequate information about treatment, collateral
risks, and available alternatives.] I The doctrine has developed as a
sure); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 457, 460, 228 S.E.2d 596, 600
(1976) (duty to disclose general terms of treatment does not include risks pursuant to
state statute); Sinkey v. Surgical Assoc., Inc., 186 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1971) (no
duty to disclose radiologist's impression); Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 754,
528 P.2d 1205, 1207 (1974) (battery cause of action not available when patient did
not object to treatment); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 190, 354 P.2d 670, 674
(1960) (physician must dislcose risks which a reasonable physician would disclose);
Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Ky. 1975) (extent of disclosure required
measured in terms of risks which physician knew or should have known); Trogun v.
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 604, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (1973) (risk must be known to
medical community before physician has duty to disclose it).
7. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-561
to 12-563 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2613 to 34-2614 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 6852 (1985); FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-3; Regs.
§§ 16-85-24 to 16-85-28 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4301 to 39-4306 (1985); IOWA
CODE § 147.137 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.40-320 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.40, 40:1299.53, 40:1299.54 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905
(1985); MINN. STAT. § 144.651, subd. 9 (1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1981);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061 (West 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2816, 2820 (1984);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.110, 41A.120 (1985); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (Mc-
Kinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1985); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54
(Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103
(Purdon 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118
(1980); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.01-07 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
14-5 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.050
(1986).
8. See LeBlang, Inforined Coisenwt-Dnty and Cansation: 4 Sme-"ev of Cunent Develop-
ments, 18 FORUM 280, 281 (1983). The phrase "informed consent" was coined in
Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d at 560. 317 P.2d at 170. See generally I HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing rationale for informed consent doctrine).
9. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 101 (4th ed. 1971).
10. A constitutional right to refuse medical treatment was first recognized in
cases involving the refusal of Jehovah Witness' to receive blood transfusions on reli-
gious grounds. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11. Waltz & Scheunenan. spra note 2, at 629. The Minnesota Patient Bill of
Rights provides: "It is the intent of this section that every patient's civil and religious
liberties, including the right to independent and personal decisions and knowledge
of available choices, shall not be infringed and that the facility shall encourage and
1986]
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natural outgrowth of the common law liability for an unauthorized
operationl2 and the constitutional right to privacy.13 The values
rooted in both legal theories are the respect for self-determination
and individual autonomy.' 4 The doctrine "is the law's recognition
that a patient is an autonomous individual who is free to authorize or
refuse the administration of medical treatment."' l Accordingly, the
physician's duty to disclose all pertinent information regarding the
treatment and risks becomes of paramount importance.16
The framework of the physician-patient relationship provides a
unique setting for these values. The patient becomes a participant
in, not merely a recipient of, the medical decision-making process.' 7
This Note examines the legal development of the informed con-
sent doctrine.18 The divergent standards for disclosure and proxi-
mate causation are compared. Emphasis is placed on concepts
currently utilized in Minnesota. The current Minnesota standards
are analyzed and discussed in relation to the effects on physicians,
patients, and the courts. Finally, the principles of informed consent
and the use of advanced directives are analyzed in light of develop-
ing ethical issues surrounding the treatment of incompetent patients.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFORMED
CONSENT DOCTRINE
The notion of consent has different meanings to the patient and
the physician. Consent, in layman's terms, is permission or approval
assist in the fullest possible exercise of these rights." MINN. STAT. § 144.65 1, subd. 1
(1984).
12. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
13. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right of privacy con-
cerning contraceptive use): In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 305 A.2d 647, 660 (1976)
(right to refuse medical treatment).
14. See I HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, snpra note 4, at 44-50.
15. See Mariner & McArdle, Consent Forms. Readabilitv, and Comprehension: The Need
For New Assessment Tools, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTHCARE 68 (April 1985). The authors
state: "Courts became convinced that a patient could truly and legally consent only if
he or she had adequate information concerning the recommended therapy." Id. at
68. See also LeBlang, supra note 8, at 280.
16. See Mariner & McArdle, supra note 15, at 68.
17. See I HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, suipra note 4, at 15-17.
18. The doctrine of informed consent originated under law, but is considered an
ethical imperative among members of health care professions. See I HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 2, 18. The doctrine is applicable in a diverse group of
settings. See generally LeBlang & Kling. Tort Liabilit Yfor A.ondisclosure: Physicians Legal
Obligation to Disclose Patient Illness and Injuy, 89 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1984); Macklin. Some
Problems in Gaining Informed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345 (1982);
McClellan, Informed Consent to .Mledical Therapy and Elxperimentation. 3 J. LEGAL MED. 81
(1982); see also BAYLEY, II'/o Should Decide?, in LEGAL. AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF 'REATI-
ING CRITICALLY AND TERMINAI.ILY 1.1. PATIENTS 6 (1982).
1\Vol. 12
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of what is proposed by another. ' In the context of tort law, it de-
scribes a willingness to suffer a particular invasion.20 Consent breaks
down into two elements in the legal context: awareness and assent.
2 1
Before awareness is established, the physician must have communi-
cated the risks to the patient. The information disclosed, the vocab-
ulary used, and the manner in which information is provided are
factors2 2 which determine whether the physician has met his obliga-
tion to adequately inform the patient.2: The patient generally
manifests his consent by signing a witnessed consent form.24
The consent form commonly receives greater emphasis than the
consent itself,25 and the two are often viewed as synonymous.2 6 This
error undercuts the entire process of informed consent. Legally,
consent is a process of shared decisionmaking.27 The patient needs
information from the physician before making a decision. The physi-
cian, in turn, requires information from the patient to enable him to
determine the requisite disclosure.28
When consent is viewed as a process and not merely a form, its
19. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 286 (College ed.
1968).
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 18, at 101.
21. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 2, at 643.
22. Id. at 643-44.
23. 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 17-18. The President's Commis-
sion surveyed physicians and the public on the definition of "informed consent."
The Commission found the following:
- 21% of the public did not know the meaning of the term. Of those who
believed they understood the term:
-44% stated it meant that the patient was informed. Of these, 10% stated
informed included risks; less than 1% mentioned alternative treatments.
-44% stated it meant the patient agreed to treatment allowing a physician to
do what was "necessary", "best", or "whatever he sees fit.'
-19% stated it meant a patient had consented to a treatment decision.
-11% stated it involved patient tnderstanding.
-7% stated it was a form.
-6% stated it was consent to the termination of treatment.
Physician responses included:
-59% stated it meant general information about a patient's condition or
treatment.
-47% stated it meant disclosing treatment risks to a patient.
-34% stated it meant a patient understanding his condition or treatment.
-26% stated it meant a patient giving permission for treatment.
-23% stated it meant a patient understanding treatment risks.
Id.
24. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS WITH
LEGAL ANALYSIS § 16, at 54 (1982) (discussing types of forms used for a variety of
treatments).
25. See I HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, su/va note 4, at 28.
26. F. RozovsKx, supra note 2, § 1.0, at 2-3.
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underlying values are respected.29 The implementation of this view,
however, requires the education of both physicians and the public.30
The prospects are optimistic. Increasing awareness of civil rights,
rising health care costs, and the sheer number of people in the health
care system have placed pressure on the medical community to pro-
vide the public with enough health care information to facilitate truly
informed decisionmaking.31
A. Early Development: Assault and Battery Actions
Early informed consent cases were brought on allegations of as-
sault and/or battery for unauthorized medical treatment.3 2 The bat-
tery theory was typically utilized when the physician performed a
substantially different treatment from the one to which the plaintiff
consented.3 3 This category of cases treated the presence or absence
of consent as determinative without assessing the quality of consent
given.34 This theory of liability was based on the recognition that
every person of sound mind has the right to determine what is to be
done with his body, and each person's right to the "inviolability of
his person."3 5
Two cases form the cornerstone of the doctrine. First, in Mohr v.
Williams,36 a Minnesota case, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having a
diseased right ear. The physician recommended surgery to which
the patient consented.37 While she was anesthetized, the physician
examined both ears. Finding significant disease in the left ear, the
physician operated on that ear without the patient's consent. De-
spite the successful outcome of the operation, the plaintiff sued the
29. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. F. RozovsKv, supra note 2, § 1.0, at 3.
31. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 380 (1982);
seegenerally B. EHRENREICH &J. EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE: POWER,
PROFITS AND POLITICS (1970); 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS. supra note 4, at 35.
32. See, e.g., Alohr, 95 Minn. at 261, 104 N.W. at 12 (physician operated on left ear
when consent given to operate on right ear); Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (tumor removed while patient
anesthetized).
33. See, e.g., Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 792, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70
(1969) (consent obtained for mvelogram without full disclosure of procedure); Bang
v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 430, 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (1958) (patient's
spermatic cords cut during prostate operation); JlIlIh, 95 Minn. at 265, 104 N.W. at
13 (physician performed surgery on left ear when consent only given for right ear
operation).
34. A. RosOFF, INFORMED CONSENT 4 (1981). Explicit attention was not given to
the scope of disclosure in the early cases. The courts focused on whether the physi-
cian exceeded the scope of the operation or violated a specific prohibition made by
the patient. I HEALTH CARE DE;CISIONS, suna note 4, at 20.
35. Mohr, 95 Minn. at 261, 104 N.W. at 12.
36. 395 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
37. Id. at 265, 104 N.W. at 13.
[Vol. 12
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physician on the theory of battery.38 The defendant physician
claimed that he was neither negligent nor possessed culpable intent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that neither element was re-
quired.3 ' The holding thus required consent despite the patient's
inability to give consent while under anesthesia, the ultimate success
of the operation and the physician's stated action in the patient's best
interests.40
The Mohr holding was accepted slowly. In 1914, a New York court
was confronted with similar issues in Schloendorffv. Society of New York
Hospital.41 In this case, the court concluded that an assault had been
committed.42 The opinion, however, did not rest with the determi-
nation that a tort had been committed. 4 3 In dicta, the court outlined
the early framework for informed consent. 44 Schloendorff is important
in two respects. First, it did not address the issue of what informa-
tion is needed to enable a patient to exercise his right of self-deter-
mination. Second, this affirmation of the right to consent emerged
from a decision which denied recovery. 4 5
The Mohr theory of assault and battery had limitations. It was
used only when an unauthorized operation or treatment had been
performed.46 The emphasis was on a lack of any prior physician dis-
closure of the intended treatment.4 7 This theory ignored the situa-
tion where a procedure was discussed, but potential risks,
complications, or viable alternatives were not disclosed. Under this
theory, consent lacked an informed basis for the patient's decision.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 268-71, 104 N.W. at 15-16.
40. Id. at 271, 104 N.W. at 16.
41. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
42. Id. at 127, 105 N.E. at 95. A fibroid tumor was removed from the plaintiff's
abdomen without her consent while undergoing a diagnostic procedure. Id. at 126,
105 N.E. at 93.
43. Id. The court stated that the conduct went beyond negligence. The physi-
cian had committed assault:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an oper-
ation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages. This is true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is
unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be
obtained.
Id. at 126, 105 N.E. at 93.
44. Id.
45. See 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, sunra note 4, at 20.
46. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
47. J. EISBERG, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION ART AND SCIENCE 192 (1982).
The classic cases is where consent is obtained for surgery on one leg and the other is
operated on by mistake. See Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955); see
also Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963) (patient's allegation
of lack of consent to sinus excision during tooth extraction dismissed because assault
not properly claimed prior to trial).
1986l
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The underlying value of knowledgeable consent was ignored.48
Later cases attempted to extend the battery theory to situations
where a physician inadequately advised his patient of potential
risks.4'9 In Scott v. Wilson, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals relied on
the battery theory when a physician failed to advise his patient of a
one percent risk of total hearing loss in a stapedectomy procedure.50
The basis for this extension was the belief that an inadequate disclo-
sure of risks vitiated the consent given.5l
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court -52 noted that the action was
actually one of malpractice rather than intentional tort.53 The un-
derlying culpable conduct was a failure to adhere to medical stan-
dards in obtaining the patient's consent. Traditional assault and
battery elements such as unlawful violence and an intent to injure
were absent in inadequate disclosure cases.
54
These distinctions made the battery cause of action an uneasy fit in
cases where a procedure was discussed, but potential risks, complica-
tions, or viable alternatives were not.55 Consent, although present,
lacked an informed basis at this point in the doctrine's development.
This ignored the goal of knowledgeable consent.5 6 A new theory,
consonant with these values, was beginning to emerge.
B. Development of Negligence Theoty
The prevailing theory of liability in informed consent cases today
48. See supra note 47.
49. Berkev. I Cal. App. 3d at 790. 82 Cal. Rptr. at 76; Trogun, 58 Wis. 2d at 600,
207 N.W.2d at 311.
50. Scott %. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), af'd. 412
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) (consent must be "infoirmed and knowledgeable"); see also
Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1973) ("an uninformed consent to
surgery obtained from a patient lacking knowledge of the dangers inherent in the
procedure is no consent at all.").
51. Wilkinson v. Vescv. 110 R.I. 606. 608. 295 A.2d 676, 686 (1972); NV. PROS-
SER, supra note 9, at 165.
52. Wilson v. Scott. 412 S.W.2d 299 (1967).
53. Id. at 302.
54. Id.
55. Ihe prevailing theory for inadcqtael disclosuc cases is now grottnded in neg-
ligence. As noted in Kinikin v. Hcupel. 305 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 1981):
[blattery is better utilized in the classic situation of a touching of a subtan-
tially and obviously diflerent kind..... o where the patient consents to
exploratory surgery aitd the doctor perforns a mastectomy as in Corn v.
Frenrh. 71 Nev. 280. 289 P.2d 173 (1955). In a case such as this one, where
the focus is more on the extent of the surgery performed and the attendant
risks rather than on the kind of surgery, it wotld seem preferable to submit
only negligent nondisclosure.
Id. at 593.
56. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 l.2d at 8. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512; Tr'gul. 58
Wis.2d at 599, 207 N.W.2d at 312; Miller v. Kennedy. I I Wash. App. 272, 275, 522
P.2d 857, 860 (1974).
[Vol. 12
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is based upon negligence principles rather than intentional tort. 57
Negligence theory, however, developed slowly. Forty-three years af-
ter Schloendorff, a California appellate court held that patient consent,
alone, was insufficient. In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees,58 the court established that consent must be "informed" to
be reliable. This procedure requires that a physician disclose all
facts necessary for the patient to make a reasoned choice59 In deter-
mining whether the necessary disclosures were made, the Salgo court
allowed the physician to consider the patient's mental and physical
condition. In essence, the court balanced the duty to provide infor-
mation adequate for decisionmaking with the duty to withhold infor-
mation which would endanger the patient's welfare.60
The negligence theory was not widely recognized until 1960 in
Natanson v. Kline. 6' The issue in Natanson was whether a failure to
disclose a risk was negligent.62 The plaintiff's complaint alleged
negligence in performing cobalt radiation therapy without warning
of the attendant risks of bodily injury or death. The Kansas Supreme
Court held that the physician was obligated to fully disclose the na-
ture of the treatment, probable consequences, and dangers.63 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that the physician's duty of disclosure was
57. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
58. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
59. Id. at 378, 317 P.2d at 181. The court stated:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liablity if
he witholds anv, facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician
may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order
to induce his patient's consent ....
Id.
60. The special consideration to the patient's mental and physical condition later
forms the basis to the therapuetic privilege, an exception to the informed consent
doctrine. See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
61. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehig. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960). Dean Prosser analyzed the development as follows:
A considerable number of late cases have involved the doctrine of "in-
formed consent", which concerns the duty of a physician or surgeon to in-
form the patient of the risk which may be involved in treatment or surgery.
The earliest cases treated this as a matter of vitiating the consent, so that
there was liability for battery. Beginning with a decision in Kansas in 1960,
it began to be recognized that this was really a matter of the standard of
professional conduct, since there will be some patients to whom disclosure
may be undesireable or even dangerous for success of treatment or the pa-
tient's own welfare; and that what should be done is a matter for profes-
sional judgment in light of the applicable medical standards. Accordingly,
the prevailing view now is that the action, regardless of its form, is in reality
one for negligence in failing to conform to the proper standard, to be deter-
mined on the basis of expert testimony as to what disclosure should be
made.
W. PROSSER, sipra note 9, § 32, at 165.
62. Natanson, 187 Kan. at 186, 354 P.2d at 671.
63. Id. at 188, 354 P.2d at 672.
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that which a reasonable physician would disclose under the same or
similar circumstances.64
Two days after Natanson was decided, the Missouri Supreme Court
was confronted with the same informed consent issue. In Mitchell v.
Robinson,65 the doctrine of informed consent was again expanded.
Citing Mohr,6 the court determined that a physician's duty to dis-
close included potential side effects of a proposed therapy.67
The expansion of negligence principles has not eliminated the bat-
tery theory. Some states still recognize its use in limited situations.68
An allegation of battery is reserved for cases in which no disclosure is
provided or consent obtained.69 There are three situations where
battery applies. The first is when the severity of an operation is
down played. 70 Second, a battery occurs when the scope of consent
is exceeded.7T Finally, battery is properly alleged when the opera-
tion performed is of a substantially different character than the one
consented to. 72 Negligence theory, in contrast, involves a failure to
disclose a given complication, risk, or alternative treatment, not the
specified treatment itself.7 3
Negligence is a more appropriate action than assault and battery in
nondisclosure cases because a willful intent to injure need not be
shown.74 Instead, the actionable conduct is based on a breach of
duty. The duty of disclosure arises because of the special relation-
64. Id. at 188, 354 P.2d at 673.
65. 334 S.W.2d I1 (Mo. 1960).
66. Id. at 15, (citing, Uoh, 95 Minn. at 261, 268, 104 N.W. at 12, 14).
67. Jlitchell, 334 S.W.2d at 15. The plaintiff's suit was based in negligence re-
sulting from the administration of electroshock and insulin treatments. The plaintiff
alleged that bone fractures were an inherent risk in the convulsions from the shock
treatments. Id.
68. The battery theory remains intact where a physician exceeds the scope of
consent or obtains no consent at all. See. e.g., Clark v. Miller, 378 N.W.2d 838, 847-
48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) Ojury may decide whether evidence supports claims of bat-
tery and negligent nondisclosure in inflormed consent cases).
69. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 304, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512.
70. See Bang, 251 Minn. at 427, 88 N.W.2d at 186.
71. See Cathemer v. Hunter, 27 Ariz. App. 780, 588 P.2d 975 (1976).
72. Kinikin. 305 N.W.2d at 589.
73. See Plutshack v. Univ. ofMinn. Hosp.. 316 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1982). The ele-
ments of negligent nondisclosure are: (I) a duty on the part of the physician to know
of a risk or alternative treatment plan: (2) a duty to disclose the risk or alternative
program, which may be established by a showing that a reasonable person in what the
physician knows or should know to be the plaintiff's position would likely attach sig-
nificance to that risk or alternative in deciding whether to consent to treatment: (3)
breach of that duty; (4) catlsation; and (5) damages. Id. at 9.
74. See, e.g., Valanson. 186 Kan. at 404, 350 P.2d at 1100 (distinction between
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ship between patient and physician.75 The physician's duty to in-
form is a fiduciary one.
76
The development of negligence theory in informed consent cases
has had several important consequences.7 7 The medical profession
gains significant advantages if sued in negligence rather than in bat-
tery. 78 First, expert opinion as to the community standard is not re-
quired in a battery action.7'9 In a negligence action, jurisdictions
measuring the physician's duty to disclose by community standards
preclude patients from establishing a prima facie case if the plaintiff
fails to obtain an expert opinion that the community standard has
been violated.8 Second, a physician's malpractice insurance usually
excludes coverage for intentional torts.8' Third, a physician could
be found liable for punitive damages under a battery action. 2 Fi-
nally, the plaintiff need not prove actual damages to recover in a bat-
tery action,83 but would be required to do so in a negligence
action.84
The effect of choosing one theory over another is substantial. The
plaintiff may gain a longer statute of limitations in negligence actions
than in intentional tort.8 5 The date the cause of action accrues may
75. Id.
76. See Taber v. Riordan, 83 Il. App. 3d 900, 902, 403 N.E.2d 1349, 1353
(1980); Miller, 11 Wash. App. at 275, 522 P.2d at 860 (physician-patient relationship
one of trust calling for physician's recogition that patient is ignorant and helpless
regarding own physical condition).
77. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512. J. LUDLAM,
supra note 2, at 25.
78. See infra note 77.
79. Id. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
80. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965) (plaintiff must offer expert
testimony to show what a reasonable medical practitioner would have done); see also
Kap, 493 F.2d at 423; Dessi v. United States, 489 F.Supp. 722, 727 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Green v. Hussey, 127 I1. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156, 161 (1970); Bly v. Rhoads,
216 Va. 645, 649, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1976) (in rare circumstances, the necessity of
disclosure is so obvious that expert testimony is not required). Cf Mallett v. Pirkey,
171 Colo. 271, 276, 466 P.2d 466, 473 (1970) (physician has burden of proof to show
that he acted in conformity with accepted medical practice).
81. Infra, note 77. See generall vJ. LUDLAM, supra note 2, at 25.
82. Minnesota law provides that punitive damages will not be awarded in a negli-
gence action absent "clear and convincing evidence that" the defendant's conduct
"shows a willful indifference to the rights or safety of others." MINN. STAT. § 549.20
(1984).
83. See generally W. PROSSER, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & G. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing situations in
which punitive damages are awarded) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
84. Dessi, 489 F. Supp. at 727; see generally, J. LUDLAM, supra note 2, at 25.
85. See id. at 24. But Cf. MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1984). Minnesota law provides
that "all actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, other health care profession-
als as defined in section 145.61, and veterinarians as defined in Chapter 156, hospi-
I.\FOIR. E CO.VSIE,\'
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also vary.86
II. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The fundamental element of the informed consent doctrine is the
physician's duty to adequately disclose to his patient the nature of
the procedure or treatment,87 attendant risks,88 expected benefits,
available alternatives, and prognosis without treatment.8'9 The pur-
pose of disclosure is to enable the patient to weigh the alternatives
and base his decision upon the facts. 9 0 As courts began recognizing
a duty to disclose risks of medical procedures, the question arose as
to how much must be disclosed. The traditional view required the
physician's disclosure duty to be measured against the prevailing
standard of accepted medical practice within the professional com-
munity.91 Over the years, the courts have developed three standards
of disclosure: (1) the professional standard; (2) the reasonable pa-
tient or objective standard; and (3) the subjective standard.
A. Professional Standard
Under the professional disclosure standard, a physician's duty is
based on custom. The standard is the reasonable physician practic-
ing in the same or similar community under same or similar circum-
stances.' 2 A two-fold duty arises: the physician is not only required
to disclose risks he is aware of, but he must also become aware of
tals, sanitoriums, for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based on
contract or tort . . ." shall be commenced within two years. Id.
Prior to 1978, wrongful death actions grounded in medical malpractice were
governed by the three year wrongful death statute of limitations. MINN. STAT.
§ 573.02, subd.l (1976). In 1978, the wrongful death statute was amended to ex-
clude malpractice actions. Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 593, 1978 Minn. Laws 331. The
Minnesota statute of limitations on malpractice actions is applicable to both battery
and negligent nondisclosure claims. See MINN. STAT. 541.07 (1984).
86. The majority position is that the cause of action accrues when the patient
discovers the injury or by reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury.
Generally, this issue is limited by a maximum time period following the date of the
alleged injury.
Minnesota, however, has expressly rejected this view except in a case of fraudu-
lent concealment. See Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Div. of Sterling Drug Inc.,
291 Minn. 145, 150, 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971). It is noteworthy that a trial court has
applied the discovery-of-the-injury rule to avoid dismissing a medical malpractice ac-
tion on the basis of an expired statute of limitations. J. EISBERG, supra note 47, at
207-08.





92. Natanson, 186 Kan. at 393, 350 P.2d at 1107; see also Note, The Growing Trend
Regarding the Doctine of Informed Consent, 14 CUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (1984).
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risks so that they may be disclosed.'93 To avoid liability, a physician
must comply with custom, and establish, through expert testimony,
that custom was in fact met. 4
The professional standard developed in response to the need for
definitive guidelines in light of the difficulty of establishing the
scope of the duty of disclosure in individual cases.' 5 Contained
within the standard is the therapeutic privilege exception.'" In the
ordinary case, a physician is still required to make a substantial dis-
closure." 7 In Natanson, the Kansas Supreme Court premised the duty
to disclose upon the patient's right to self-determination,98 but
stated that "however the physician may best discharge his obligation
to the patient . . . involves primarily a question of medical judg-
ment."' 9 Notwithstanding that the doctrine is based upon the pa-
tient's right of self-determination, it is clear that physicians are given
much discretion when exercising professional judgment under this
93. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 2, at 630-31. The authors also discuss the
scope of the physician's duty to discover unknown risks when conducting innovative
therapies or experimental surgery. Id. at 632-33.
94. See, e.g., Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir. 1981); Dewes v. Indian
Health Serv., 504 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.S.D. 1980); Dessi. 489 F. Supp. at 727; Fuller
v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 478, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1980); Robinson v. Mroz, 433 A.2d
1051, 1056 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals, 400 So. 2d
820, 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Searcey v. Manganhas, 415 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind.
App. 1981); Natanson, 186 Kan. at 393, 350 P.2d at 1093; Woolley v. Henderson, 418
A.2d 1123, 1124 (Me. 1980); Rick v.Jaskolski, 412 Mich. 206, 209, 313 N.W.2d 893,
896 (1981); Cress v. Meyer, 626 S.W.2d 430, 436-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); MacPher-
son v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 268, 287 S.E.2d 892, 895-96 (1982); Roark v. Allen, 633
S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982); Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295, 1297-98 (Utah
1976); B1y, 216 Va. 645, 649, 222 S.E.2d 783, 786-87.
95. This difficulty was explained by one author as follows:
[g]iven the inevitable combination of diseases and disorders with various
physical and psychological characteristics of individual patients, it is virtually
impossible to delineate what specific information must be disclosed in each
case. It would be impractical and unreasonable to expect a physician to dis-
close all information associated with a proposed procedure or treatment,
and then to evaluate each patient's comprehension of the available medical
data.
Note, supra note 92, at 240.
96. The Natanson court explained:
[t]o make a complete disclosure of all facts, diagnoses and alternatives or
possibilities which may occur to the doctor could so alarm the patient that it
would, in fact, constitute bad medical practice. There is probably a privi-
lege, on therapeutic grounds, to withhold the specific diagnoses where the
disclosure would seriously jeopardize the recovery of an unstable, tempera-
mental or severely depressed patient.
NVatanson, 186 Kan. at 390, 350 P.2d at 1103. See infra notes 183-202 and accompany-
ing text.
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standard. I00
The most extreme application of the professional standard is the
"strict locality rule."M, This rule requires the plaintiff to establish
that the physician failed to meet the disclosure standards of the same
community. I02 In effect, the plaintiff is required to locate an expert
with knowledge of the local custom of disclosure who would be will-
ing to testify against one of his fellow medical associates.103 This
burden may be impossible to meet in smaller communities.104
100. See id. The philosophy underlying the professional community standard is
one familiar to attorneys; self-regulation and the profession's freedom to set its own
legal standards of conduct. See Holton, 534 S.W.2d at 788, where the court observed:
"The policy justification implicitly advanced is the respect which courts have had for
the learning of a fellow profession accompanied by reluctance to overburden it 'with
liability based on uneducated judgment.' " Id.
101. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, I ll Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1975)
(quoting Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo. 1962)) (scope of disclosure de-
pends on the "circumstances of the particular case and upon the general practice
followed by the medical profession in the locality"); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905,
909 (Miss. 1970) (directed verdict for physician upheld when plaintiff failed to estab-
lish the professional standard according to the customs of medical practice in the
local area); B/y, 216 Va. at 651, 222 S.E 2d at 789 (acknowledging the merits of a
national standard but refusing to reject the locality rule based on stare decisis).
102. Bly, 216 Va. at 651, 222 S.E.2d at 789.
103. Id, see also Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971),
where the court rejected the locality rule on practical grounds. The court stated:
"We must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding a physician who would breach
the 'community of silence' by testifying against the interest of one of his professional
colleagues." Id. at 267, 286 A.2d at 650.
104. Bly, 216 Va. at 645, 222 S.E.2d at 783. Georgia has earned the reputation of
being the most restrictive of all of the states in its limitation of patients' rights. A.
RosoFF, supra note 34, at 91. In Young v. Yarn, 133 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113
(1975), a plastic surgeon was held not accountable for his failure to warn a female
patient undergoing elective cosmetic surgery that the procedure could cause facial
scarring. Id. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114. The court narrowly construed a Georgia
statute which provided that the physician must disclose "in general terms the treat-
ment or course of treatment." Id. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114 (construing CODE OF GA.
ANN. § 88-2906 (Harrison 1973)). The court refused to extend the definition of
treatment to include potential risks. See id. Georgia courts have held in other cases
that legislative intent was to free the health care provider from the informed consent
doctrine applied in other states. See, e.g., Robinson v. Parrish, 251 Ga. 496, 497, 306
S.E.2d 922, 923 (1983) (holding that a physician need not disclose possible risks and
complications of a sterilization procedure, but need only fully inform the patient of
intended results of the operation); Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga. App. 344, 306 S.E.2d
404 (1983) (noting that Georgia is "apparently alone among the states" which does
not follow the informed consent doctrine, but refuses to acknowledge it based on
stare decisis and judicial interpretation of Georgia Medical Consent Law); Fox v. Co-
hen, 160 Ga. App. 270, 271, 287 S.E.2d 272, 273 (1981) (holding that an attending
physician is required to inform his patient of the treatment but not risks); Parr v.
Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 451, 454, 228 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1976) (court
upheld summary judgment for defendant hospital by stating absent written consent,
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An illustrative case of the professional standard is Woolley v. Hen-
derson. 105 In Woolley, the plaintiff suffered spinal cord injuries while
undergoing back surgery.1" She sued her physician, alleging a fail-
ure to disclose risks which included a dural tear.10 7 The court held
that the scope of the physician's duty is measured by the practices of
a reasonable physician in the same specialty.l08
Similarly, most jurisdictions require expert testimony to prove that
the professional standard of disclosure was breached.1') In addition
to case law, many state legislatures are adopting informed consent
statutes requiring expert testimony. I ) The rationale for this sup-
port is the fear that malpractice judgments will be based on hindsight
and emotion rather than upon a legal standard of care.' I
Despite its majority support, the professional standard has re-
ceived considerable criticism. First, opponents protest that the stan-
dard allows the medical profession to determine its own standard of
disclosure.' 12 This may result in insufficient medical regulation.] 13
Second, physicians may disagree on various medical theories and
treatments. This questions whether a medical community standard,
in fact, exists.' '4 Third, the reluctance of physicians to testify against
professional colleagues presents the plaintiff with significant obsta-
105. 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980).
106. Id. at 1126.
107. Id. at 1131.
108. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 12-563 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2613
(1985); DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 18, § 6852; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.46 (1986); IDAHO
CODE ch. 39, § 4304 (1984); MAINE REV. STAT ANN. ch. 24 § 2905(1)A (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1985); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4401-a (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.13 (1985); N.D. CODE § 26-40.1-020.5 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118
(1984); VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 12, § 1909 (1985).
111. In Woolley, 418 A.2d at 1131, the Maine Supreme Court noted:
We are not unmindful of the practical implication of dispensing with the
requirement of expert testimony. . . . Inherent in such a [decision] is the
potential danger that ajury, composed of laymen and gifted with the benefit
of hindsight, will divine the breach of a disclosure obligation largely on the
basis of the unfortunate result.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 28 n.51; see also Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 560 (D.C. App. 1982);
Meyer v. McDonnell, 40 Md. App. 524, 526, 392 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1978); Morgan v.
Rosenberg, 370 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. 1963); Henning v. Parsons, 95 N.M. 454, 623
P.2d 574 (1980); Halldin v. Peterson, 39 Wis. 2d 668, 159 N.W.2d 738 (1968);
Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Crisis and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 187
(1966); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV. MAR. L. REV. 520, 524 (1965). Cf Vo-
gel & Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physician's Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 52 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Cooper, 220 Pa. Super. at 267, 286 A.2d at 650 (quoting Berkey v.
Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1970)).
19861
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cles of proof.] 15 Finally, the professional standard ignores a pa-
tient's right of autonomy and self-determination' ' by allowing the
medical community to determine what the patient needs to know.' 17
B. Reasonable Patient or Objective Standard
The reasonable patient standard shifts focus from the reasonable
physician to the reasonable patient. This standard emphasizes the
patient's need for medical information.' 18 The physician's duty to
disclose is measured by the patient's right of self-decision.I I Risks
must be disclosed if material to the decision-making process.' 2 0 The
issue is whether a reasonable person, in the position of the patient,
would consider the information material in choosing a course of
treatment.' 2' The landmark case in this area is Canterbury v.
Spence, 122 a District of Columbia Circuit Court case.
In Canterbury, a physician performed a laminectomy on a patient
without disclosing the possibility of paralysis.' 2 3 The patient subse-
115. See Natanson, 186 Kan. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1106. The philosophy underlying
the professional community standard is based on the desire to self-regulate and set
professional standards of conduct; see also Bennett v. Graves, 557 S.W.2d 893, 895
(Ky. App. 1977) (court refused to hold physician liable even if patient was not in-
formed that sterilization procedure was not absolutely foolproof, because he was
guilty of, if anything, an honest mistake in judgment).
Another policy justification for the professional standard of disclosure is to avoid
"further proliferation of medical malpractice actions in a situation already approach-
ing a national crisis." Bly, 216 Va. at 649, 222 S.E.2d at 787; see generallv Frank, In-
pending Battle - A.M.A. Pushing Tort Reforni, A.B.A. J. Oct. 1985, at 18.
116. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The expert testimony require-
ment has received further criticism. A "conspiracy of silence" has been alleged. The
conspiracy of silence denotes a reluctance of physicians to testify against each other,
making the plaintiff's proof of deviation from custom very difficult. See, e.g., Huffman
v. Lundquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951) (Carter, J. dissenting).
117. See Boland, The Doctrine of Lack of Consent and Lack of Informed Consent in Medical
Procedures in Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1984).
118. Id.
119. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784; Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 515 (test for determining whether a risk must be disclosed is its materiality to
the patient's decision). But see Trognn, 58 Wis. 2d at 604, 207 N.W.2d at 315 (physi-
cian was not negligent in not informing patient because there was overwhelming evi-
dence that "physicians in Milwaukee in 1968 were unaware of the side-effects of
hepatitis caused by the drug INH.")
120. The Canterbury court stated: " '[a] risk is thus material when a reasonable per-
son, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not
to forego the proposed therapy.' " Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Waltz &
Scheuneman, supra note 2, at 640).
121. Id. at 787.
122. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
123. Id. at 777-79. In addition to the surgery, the patient fell out of bed. It was
after the fall that he noticed the paralysis. Id. at 777.
[Vol. 12
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quently experienced permanent paralysis of the lower half of his
body.-124 The patient sued, alleging malpractice and a failure to dis-
close a material risk.125 The impact of the decision lies in the court's
analysis of the informed consent issue.
The court began by rejecting the professional community stan-
dard.'1 6 It stated that the professional community standard is anti-
thetical to individual autonomy, '2 7 which is the purpose of informed
consent. The Canterbury court reasoned that courts, not medical cus-
tom, should define the standard of disclosure.' 2 8 The court rejected
a subjective standard which requires disclosure of those risks that the
particular patient deems material. 129 The court adopted an objective
standard. 130 The focus of the standard is on the reasonable patient
and what he believes is material. Expert opinion, therefore, is not
required to show the materiality of risks. A jury of presumably rea-
sonable persons determines whether a physician's disclosure was suf-
ficient to satisfy the reasonable person's need for informed consent.
Cobbs v. Grant'3 clarified the disclosure requirements. In Cobbs,
the California Supreme Court distinguished between common and
complicated procedures.132 In complicated, life-threatening proce-
dures, the duty to disclose all risks and complications is height-
ened.133 In contrast, disclosure of minor risks can be eliminated in
common procedures.13 4 Factors such as the incidence of injury and
the degree of harm must also be considered when determining
whether a risk is material.135 A small chance of great injury may be
material while a small chance of a lesser injury may not.136
The reasonable patient standard received further definition by the
California Supreme Court in Truman v. Thomas. 137 In Truman, a phy-
124. Id. at 778.
125. Id. at 777.
126. Id. at 783-85.
127. Id. at 786.
128. Id. at 786-87.
129. Id. at 787.
130. Id.
131. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). In Cobbs, the plaintiff
was admitted for surgical repair of a duodenal ulcer. The surgery was successful,
however, the plaintiff's spleen was nicked during the procedure. This required a
second operation to remove the spleen. A potential complication of duodenal sur-
gery is subsequent ulcers. The plaintiff also developed a second ulcer and required a
third surgery. Severe bleeding complicated the third surgery. Id.
132. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
133. See id.
134. Id. (disclosure is unnecessary when it is common knowledge that the actual
occurrence of such risks inherent in the procedure are uncommon).
135. LeBlang, supra note 8, at 284.
136. Id.
137. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
INFI.OR.MIEDl CO.VSEAT
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sician failed to perform a Pap smear on a patient who later died of
cervical cancer.':8 Expert testimony established that the lesion
would have been detected if she had undergone the test sometime
during the five year period prior to her death. Proper treatment at
that time would have saved her life. The issue before the court was
whether the physician breached a duty to inform the patient of the
risks of foregoing the test.':13 The court held that material informa-
tion includes that which is necessary for a patient to decide to forego
as well as to undergo treatment.140
C. Subjective Standard
A second minority position is the subjective standard. This stan-
dard focuses exclusively upon the particular patient. The issue to be
addressed is whether the particular patient, after knowing all of the
risks, would have consented to the procedure. As the focus of the
inquiry is on the patient's tesitmony, expert medical tesitmony is not
necessary.
The rationale for this approach was addressed by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Scott v. Bradford. 141 As the right to information
required for decisionmaking is at the core of the full disclosure
rule, focus on the particular patient's need for information best ad-
vances this objective. 142 If the emphasis is shifted to the reasonable
patient, the patient with unique needs loses his right of self-
determination. 143
The exclusive focus upon the patient, however, ignores the needs
of the physician. The Scott court acknowledged that this places the
physician at the mercy of the patient's hindsight.'44 The court's so-
lution proposes that a physician protect himself by insuring that he
adequately inform each patient he treats.' 4 5 A practical application
of this recommendation is unclear.146
138. Id. at 289, 611 P.2d at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 240, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
141. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).




146. A study by the President's Commission evaluated public and physician pref-
erences in disclosure standards. The results demonstrated:
A. Professional Standard
26% of physicians preferred
18% of patients preferred
B. Objective or Reasonable Patient Standard
21% of physicians preferred
28% of public preferred
IVAl 12
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
In limited circumstances, a physician is not legally obligated to dis-
close information regarding risks or alternative treatments. In these
cases, treatment may be administered without consent or disclosure
of material facts. Medical emergencies, 147 the extension doctrine, 148
and the therapeutic privilege constitute the three major
exceptions, '
49
Less common exceptions include situations when the patient was
actually aware of the risk,] 50 when the risk was a matter of common
knowledge,151 and when the risk was not generally known to the
medical community at the time of treatment. 52 Other exceptions
may arise when the risk would occur only if and when a procedure is
improperly performed,153 when the procedure is simple and the risk
of danger commonly appreciated as remote, ' 54 and when the patient
has requested not to be informed.155
A. Medical Emergency
The emergency exception predates the emergence of the informed
consent doctrine.156 The exception is so basic that its non-occur-
rence is often included as a part of the definition of the duty to
C. Subjective or Particular Patient Standard
42% of physicians preferred
46% of the public preferred
In addition, 1% of the public and 8% of the physicians felt that there should be no
standard. Furthermore, 7% of the public and 4% of the physicians were uncertain as
to which standard they preferred. I HEAILTIH CARE DECISIONS, snpra note 4, at 106.
147. See ifra notes 156-64.
148. See ifa notes 165-74.
149. See infra notes 175-94.
150. Canterbuny, 464 F.2d at 788; Sard. 379 A.2d at 1022; Harnish, 439 N.E.2d at
243; Scaria, 68 Wis. 2d at 6, 227 N.W.2d at 653; See generally. J. LUDLAM, snpra note 2,
at 37.
151. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at 618, 295 A.2d at 689; Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022.
See generally J. LUDI.AM, sUPra note 2, at 37.
152. See, e.g., Trogtn, 58 Wis. 2d at 604, 207 N.W.2d at 315 (physician not negli-
gent for not informing patient of side-elfects of drug not known to local medical
community); see also Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022-23 (physician not obligated to disclose
unknown risks).
153. See Mallett v. Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466, 470 (Colo. 1970);J. LUDLAM, supra note 2.
at 37.
154. Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 1003 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Scaria, 227
N.W.2d at 653; see generally J. IAJDI.AM, supra note 2, at 36 (minor and immaterial risks
are essentially synonymous); Comment, Inforined Consent: The Patients Right to Compre-
bend, 27 How. L.J. 975. 988 (1984).
155. Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d
at 245, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516; see also J. IJDLXM, spra note 2, at 37.
156. Alo/, 95 Minn. at 269-70, 104 N.W. at 15.
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disclose. 157
The rationale behind the emergency exception is that a patient
should not be denied medical treatment when he is not in a condi-
tion to properly evaluate the data.' 5 8 When the potential harm from
a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by
the proposed treatment, obtaining the patient's informed consent is
not required. 15 9 The exception, however, requires exigent circum-
stances. A mistake in judgment may create liability for failure to dis-
close material facts.160
Two criteria must be met to prove a medical emergency vitiating
the need for disclosure. t(i First, the patient must be incapacitated to
such an extent that the ability to make an informed choice is ab-
sent.' 6 2 The existence of incapacity is a factual question. Second, a
life-threatening condition must indicate immediate treatment. The
urgent circumstances must foreclose attempts to procure consent
from a another person able to consent on the patient's behalf.163
Additional statutory requirements may also exist.' 64
B. Extension Doctrine
Closely related to the medical emergency exception is the exten-
sion doctrine. This exception allows physicians to extend the scope
of a medical treatment undertaken if such further procedures are jus-
tified by facts discovered during the authorized procedure.16 5
The extension doctrine is illustrated in Kennedy v. Parrott. 166 In
Kennedy, the physician, without consent, punctured ovarian cysts dur-
ing an appendectomy.16 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court found
for the physician citing the need for latitude in the exercise of profes-
sional judgement.'68 Under this doctrine, physician's are allowed to
157. See, e.g., Sard, 379 A.2d at 1019 (doctrine of informed consent only applies to
nonemergent situations). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614 (Supp. 1985) (plaintiff
has burden of proving nonemergency circumstances).
158. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
159. Canferbuiy, 464 F.2d at 788. Custom and practice also require that the physi-
cian attempt to obtain a relative's consent if possible. Id. at 789; F. RosovsKY, supra
note 2, at 17.
160. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788, 789 n.92.
161. F. RozovsKY, supra note 2. at 89.
162. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
163. Id. at 789; see also P/u/shack, 316 N.W.2d at 9.
164. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-7 (1981).
165. A. RosofF, supra note 34, at 1I.
166. 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
167. Id. at 361, 90 S.E.2d at 760.
168. Id. at 361, 90 S.E.2d at 759. ]The court stated: "In major internal operations,
both the patient and the surgeon know the exact condition of the patient cannot be
finally and completely diagnosed until after the patien is completely anesthe-
tized .. " Id.
[Vol. 12
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/5
IFOR.IED CONVSENT
extend the scope of the originally contemplated procedure to rem-
edy newly discovered diseased conditions in the area of the original
incision.'"9 The patient must be unable to give consent at the time
and others with authority to consent must be unavailable.170 The
consent originally given is construed as general in nature.171
Case law in Minnesota and other jurisdictions indicates that the
extension doctrine should be narrowly applied. 172 In Minnesota, the
surgeon may extend the operation to remove a newly discovered dis-
eased condition only if the patient's life would otherwise be endan-
gered.173 Accordingly, compelling circumstances must be shown to
invoke this exception.74
C. Therapeutic Privilege
There are occasions when full disclosure may adversely affect a pa-
tient's health. The law recognizes this in providing the therapeutic
privilege. 175 This privilege allows the physician to withhold material
information which would cause the patient's physical or mental con-
dition to deteriorate. 176 The privilege underscores the notion that
the physician-patient relationship requires the physician to exercise
discretion in disclosing information in accordance with the patient's
best interests. 177 States utilizing the professional standard for dis-
closure may consider the exception in determining the scope of dis-
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id., (citing King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922) (finding that the
removal of plaintiff's diseased reproductive organs was authorized by the extension
doctrine even though plaintiff told her physician she wanted to undergo surgery only
so that she could bear children); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 918, 237 N.W.
444, 449 (1931) (extension doctrine applied and implies consent found where pa-
tient expected surgeon to "fix" his arm and it was thereafter amputated); Baxter v.
Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 263 (1931) (patient, who acquiesced to physician's
treatments, impliedly authorized the physician to diagnose the problem and use
treatment the physician deenmed necessary).
172. See Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 593 (citing Bang, 251 Minn. at 434, 88 N.W.2d at
190).
173. Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 593; Bang. 251 Minn. at 434, 88 N.W.2d at 190; .lohr,.
95 Minn. at 269, 104 N.W. at 15. In Kinikin. the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated
in a footnote that the extension doctrine exception applies in a battery action, while it
would be deemed within the emergency exception in a negligent nondisclosure ac-
tion. Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 593 n.2: see also Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.
1964) (physician's unauthorized removal of a patient's mole while undergoing unre-
lated and authorized surgery was not within the extension exception when there was
no evidence of necessity).
174. See Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d at 593.
175. The origin of the therapeutic privilege can be traced to Salgo. 154 Cal. App.
2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
176. SeeJ. LUDLAM, suprW note 2, at 38.
177. Natanson, 186 Kan. at 402, 350 P.2d at 1103.
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closure.178 At least one state court has indicated that under some
circumstances, complete disclosure may constitute "bad medical
practice." 17,)
The privilege is also a viable exception in states applying the rea-
sonable patient standard of disclosure. 180 The privilege is "carefully
circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure
rule itself."18, The physician is not allowed to withhold information
for the reason that "divulgence might prompt the patient to forego
therapy the physician feels the patient really needs."18-
To use the privilege, the physician must demonstrate the existence
of three factors. First, the patient's circumstances must be consid-
ered.l8 3 Second, the physician must believe that full disclosure
would adversely affect the patient.18 4 The privilege has been
deemed appropriate when patients would "become so ill or emotion-
ally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or
complicate or hinder treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological
damage to the patient."185 Another court stated that the privilege
would be justified when disclosure would upset the patient to the
point of preventing that patient from "dispassionately" weighing the
risks of refusing the recommended treatment.18 6 Finally, reasonable
discretion must be used in the manner and extent of disclosure.187
The therapeutic privilege is dependent upon the physician's judg-
ment. The physician must determine what information is reasonable
under a specific set of circumstances.188 Studies indicate that physi-
cians vastly overuse the therapeutic privilege as an excuse for not
informing patients of the facts they are entitled to know. '8 ) Use of
the therapeutic privilege is designed to be limited. The physician
asserting the privilege as a defense bears the burden of proving the
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Canlerburv, 464 F.2d at 777; Sard, 379 A.2d 1014; Cobbs. 8 Cal. 3d at 229,
502 P.2d at 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 505; Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 684; Wilkinson. 110 R.I.
at 606, 295 A.2d at 676; Scaria, 68 Wis. 2d at 1, 227 N.W.2d at 647.
181. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. The President's Commission stated: "The obvi-
ous danger with such an exception is the ease with which it can swallow the rule,
thereby legitimating wholesale noncompliance with the general obligation of disclo-
sure." I HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, Sn/pra note 4, at 95.
182. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
183. F. RozovsKv, supra note 2, at 99.
184. Id. at 100.
185. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
186. Natanson, 186 Kan. at 402, 350 P.2d a( 1103.
187. F. RozovsKv, supra note 2, at 100.
188. Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d at 378, 317 P.2d at 181 ("the physician has such
discretion consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an in-
formed consent").
189. 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, s11pra rnote 4, at 96.
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Minnesota recognizes the therapuetic privilege.tI Physicians ex-
ercising the therapeutic privilege must disclose the risk information
to the patient's family, guardian, or other representative. 19 2 In addi-
tion, the physician must document the reason for the nondisclosure
in the patient's medical record.'9 Accordingly, the therapuetic priv-
ilege is of limited use for Minnesota physicians.194
IV. CAUSATION
To prevail in an informed consent case, the plaintiff must prove
that the undisclosed risk resulted in harm.195 The plaintiff must also
show that disclosure of the risk would have resulted in a decision not
to undergo the proposed medical treatment.19 6 The second compo-
nent of causation presents a difficult question. Courts have strug-
gled with the question of whether to require an objective or
subjective standard of determination. 197
A. Objective Standard
The standard of causation addresses whether the patient, if in-
formed of the risks, would have consented to the treatment or proce-
dure. The objective standard has been described as what a "prudent
person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably in-
formed of all perils bearing sigificance."198 The reference point
under the objective standard is the reasonable person. This focus
avoids the plaintiff's benefit of hindsight. Since injury has occurred,
190. Id. at 99.
191. Cornfeldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 700.
192. MINN. STAT. § 144.651, subd. 9 (1984).
193. See id. The statute as originally passed made disclosure to a patient's guard-
ian or designee discretionary, and did not mandate the documentation of the inadvis-
ability of disclosure:
Every patient can reasonably expect to obtain from his physician or the resi-
dent physician of the facility complete and current information concerning
the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis in terms and language he can under-
stand. In such cases that it is not medically advisable to give such informa-
tion to the patient the information may be made available to the appropriate
person in his behalf.
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 688, § I, 1973 Minn. Laws 1876 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 144.65 1, subd. 2 (1974)). This statute was amended to include mandatory require-
ments in 1983. See Act of June 1, 1983, ch. 248, § 1, 1983 Minn. Laws 964, 967-72
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (1984)).
194. MINN. STAT. § 144.651. subd. 9 (1984).
195. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778.
196. Id.
197. LeBlang, supra note 8, at 287.
198. Id. at 791. The court will consider the patient's testimony regarding what he
would have done if informed of the risks, but this is not determinative of causation.
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the individual patient undoubtedly feels that he would not have un-
dergone the treatment now knowing the results.1'o'
Whether the patient would have consented to the procedure is a
question of fact. The reason for the medical procedure,200 the inci-
dence of risk,201 and the severity of potential injury,202 must be bal-
anced against considerations pertinent to living with the treatment
or procedure.203 These may include such concerns as chronic pain,
disfigurement, immobility, compromised health, or a shortened life-
span. The testimony of the patient is relevant but not controlling.204
The objective standard is the majority position.205
B. Subjective Standard
The subjective standard focuses on the individual patient. The pa-
tient must establish that he would not have consented to the treat-
ment had proper risks been disclosed.206 Several jurisdictions
recognize its use. 20 7
The subjective standard is defended as the sole protector of indi-
vidual needs. In MacPherson v. Ellis,208 the North Carolina Supreme
Court admitted that a plaintiff's testimony may be self-serving. The
court reasoned, however, that the needs of the particular patient, not
the reasonable patient, are at issue.209 Absent a subjective standard,
the needs of patients outside the mainstream are sacrificed.210
Critics of the subjective standard do not contest this reasoning.
The principle criticism is that the standard is unreliable. Recon-
structing a patient's hypothesized state of mind is extremely diffi-
199. See Cornfeldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 701-02.
200. See LeBlang, supra note 8. at 286.
201. C'anterbury, 464 F.2d at 788.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 791.
205. See LeBlang, supra note 8. at 287-88.
206. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975); Perrin v.
Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Iowa 1973); MacPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266. 269.
287 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1982): Masquat v. Maguire. 638 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Okla. 1981):
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554. 558 (Okla. 1979).
207. See infra note 206.
208. 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892.
209. Id. at 271, 297 S.E.2d at 897. This decision was subsequently changed by
legislative action. See N.C. (;EN. STxr. § 90-21-13 (1985) (adopting a reasonable per-
son standard).
210. MacPherson, 305 N.C. at 271. 297 S.E.2d at 897. The court stated: "Ilis
supposedly inviolable right to decide for himself what is to be done with his body is
made subject to a standard set by others. The right to base one's consent on proper
information is effectively vitiated for those with Fears, apprehensions, religious be-
liefs, or superstitions outside the mainstream of society." Id.
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cult.2'' This difficulty is exacerbated by the effect of hindsight and
the probable bitterness which follows an unsuccessful treatment. 2 12
The physician is the natural target of this bitterness.2l3
V. MINNESOTA DEVELOPMENTS- NEGLIGENT NONDISCLOSURE
Minnesota was a leading state in informed consent jurisprudence
during the doctrine's formative years.2 14 The early Minnesota cases
were grounded upon an assault and battery theory of recovery. 2 15
Minnesota followed other jurisdictions in its development of battery
theory in informed consent cases.
21 6
In Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital,2 17 the Minnesota Supreme
Court departed from the narrow battery view. In Bang, the plaintiff
submitted to a cystoscopic examination to investigate an enlarged
prostate and bladder pain. 2 18 The physician failed to disclose that
the patient's spermatic ducts might be severed during the
procedure. 2 1 1)
Faced with a battery action, the Minnesota Supreme Court recog-
nized that an inadequate disclosure of risks negated prior consent. 220
It reversed the trial court's dismissal and granted a new trial on the
issue of whether or not there was an unauthorized operation.221 In
the context of a disposition on battery grounds,222 the court articu-
lated what it termed a "reasonable rule."223 The court stated:
"where a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an opera-
tion alternative situations and no immediate emergency exists, a pa-
tient should be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a
chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation."224
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that a physician must
211. Cornfeldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 701.
212. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91; Cornfeldt L 262 N.W.2d at 701.
213. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91.
214. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 28-33.
217. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186.
218. Id. at 428, 88 N.W.2d at 187.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 429, 88 N.W.2d at 190.
221. Id.
222. Id. It is interesting to note that, despite further development in the theories
of battery and negligent nondisclosure, Bang has never been overruled. In fact, in
Kohoutek v. Hafne; 383 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. 1986), the Minnesota Supreme Court
cites to Bang to describe the parameters of battery. Fhe reason for this max, be that
the Bang court appears to view sterilization as a separate procedure which is unau-
thorized. This view would be consistent with the contemporary distinction between
battery and negligent nondisclosure. Id.
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be afforded reasonable latitude when exercising his medical discre-
tion. The court, however, failed to offer guidance on the fine line
between discretion and battery.225 Bang required the physician to
disclose possible risks prior to a proposed treatment.2 26 A corollary
was also emerging. The consideration of potential risks involves as-
certaining alternative treatments and their attendant risks.
The concept of negligent nondisclosure was introduced in Cornfeldt
v. Tongen. 22 7 In Cornfeldt, the plaintiff underwent a gastrectomy, a
surgical procedure to remove a cancerous portion of her stomach.22 8
Routine preoperative tests showed some liver dysfunction sug-
gesting the possibility of hepatitis. Hepatitis would have materially
increased the risks of surgery. The patient consented to surgery
without knowing the potential risk and died two months later of
hepatitis.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court
judgment for the defendant physicians.229 The court held that a
cause of action existed for "negligent nondisclosure of risks attend-
ant to proposed or alternative methods of treatment."230 Addition-
ally, the court delineated standards of conduct for physicians and
causation requirements. 23
Addressing the issue of disclosure, the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted a modified objective or patient based standard.232 First, a
physician's failure to disclose risks "that would have been disclosed
under accepted medical practice thus should be a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition of liability."-233 Recognizing the patient's right
to self-determination, there would be no reason to withhold informa-
tion if medical practice "dictates disclosure."
Second, even if a physician's disclosure conforms to accepted med-
ical practice, he may be liable if he fails to inform his patient of a
significant risk of treatment or of a treatment alternative.
225. Id. at 429, 439, 88 N.W.2d at 189-90.
226. Id. at 439, 88 N.W.2d at 190. The court stated that, in nonemergency cir-
cumstances, the patient should have enough information to weigh risk of treatment
against risks of no treatment. Id.
227. 262 N.W.2d at 684.
228. Id. at 690.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 669. The court stated:
When the patient substantially understands the nature and character of the
touching, an action for oegl eI nondisclosme will lie if the patient is not prop-
erly informed of a risk inhering in the treatment, the undisclosed risk nmate-
rialized in harm, and consent to the treatment would not have been secured
if the risk had been disclosed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
231. Id. at 699-703.
232. Id. at 701-02.
233. Id. at 702.
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The court next weighed the various standards of causation in
reaching its conclusion. The court discarded the subjective stan-
dard secondary to concern for the bias of hindsight and the bitter-
ness which could follow an unsuccessful treatment or procedure.
The Minnesota court held that the objective standard was the prefer-
able measure of probable cause.
2 4
Three years after Cornfeldt I, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard a
second appeal. In Cornfeldt II, the appellant asserted that the trial
court erred in finding that the undisclosed risk materialized as a re-
sult of the treatment. 23 5 The court articulated five elements to be
presented to establish a claim for negligent nondisclosure: (1) a duty
of the physician to know of a risk or alternative plan; (2) a duty to
disclose the risk or alternative plan; (3) breach of that duty; (4) cau-
sation; and (5) damages.236 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
for lack of causation.237
The court stated that, to avoid a directed verdict, the plaintiff must
introduce expert medical testimony that it was "more probable than
not" that the death resulted from the physician's negligence.238 The
plaintiff's expert testified that performing surgery on patients with
liver disease increases the risk of serious complications.239 The er-
ror arose in failing to establish that the plaintiff probably died as a
result of the increased risk.240
The doctrine of negligent nondisclosure was further refined in
Kinikin v. Heupel.2 4 1 In Kinikin, the plaintiff had extensive fibrocystic
breast disease. Even though benign, the condition may be a precur-
sor to cancer. 242 The plaintiff consented to a biopsy. She also con-
sented to a mastectomy, but only in the event that cancer was
discovered.243 During the course of the operation, significant fibro-
cystic disease was found. The physician essentially removed both
breasts to excise the diseased tissue. The plaintiff suffered postoper-
ative gangrene in the incision sites ultimately causing deformity and
scarring. She sued alleging both battery and negligent non-
disclosure.
234. Id.
235. 295 N.W.2d at 638.
236. Id. at 640.
237. Id. Specifically, the court stated: "Our review of the record indicates that the
reference to halothane hepatitis are replete with terms such as 'possibilitv,' 'impres-
sion,' 'apparently,' 'suspicion,' and 'speculated'-hardly language expressing the de-




241. 305 N.W.2d at 589.
242. Id. at 591.
243. Id. at 592.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court held that both causes of action
were properly submitted to the jury.244 In determining the physi-
cian's duty to disclose information, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the following must be disclosed: (1) the risks of death or
serious bodily harm which are of significant probability; (2) the risks
that a skilled physician within the community would reveal; and (3)
any risks which a physician knows a particular patient would attach
significance.245
The factual setting of Kinikin highlights the physician's expanded
duty where he is or can be aware of a patient's special needs.246 The
plaintiff had a "cancer phobia" which the physician understood.24v
The court noted that this peculiar fear might require the defendant
physician to devote extra time discussing risks specifically relating to
the patient's fears. 24 8 This duty, however, is in addition to, not in
place of the disclosure of risks required by acceptable medical
practice.249
Once the materiality of a risk has been established, causation re-
mains a significant obstacle. In Plutshack v. University of Minnesota Hos-
pitals, 25o this obstacle was insurmountable. In Plutshack, a five month
old child suffered cardiac arrest while undergoing a lumbar punc-
ture.2 5 1 The infant's mother alleged failure to obtain actual and in-
formed consent. 2 5
2
The Minnesota Supreme Court quickly disposed of the actual con-
sent claim through use of the medical emergency exception. 2 53 A
potential diagnosis of meningitis posed a life-threatening situation
requiring immediate medical treatment. The failure to inform claim
was similarly dismissed for failure to prove causation. No evidence
proved that the risk of cardiac arrest was significant in lumbar punc-
ture procedures with a child such as the plaintiff's.
244. Id. at 594
245. Id. at 595. The court stated:
A physician must disclose risks of death or serious bodily harm which are of
significant probability. . . . Risks which a skilled practitioner of good stand-
ing in the community would reveal must also be disclosed. . . . Lastly, to
the extent a doctor is or can be aware that his patient attaches particular
significance to risks, not generally considered by the medical profession se-







250. Plutshack, 316 N.W.2d 1.
251. Id. at 5. The child suffered permanent neurological damage. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 8-9.
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Expert testimony .is crucial in establishing the elements of negli-
gent nondisclosure. The Minnesota Supreme Court delineated the
role of expert testimony in negligent nondisclosure cases in Reinhardt
v. Colton.2 5 4 Expert testimony is necessary to establish that a risk in
fact exists and that it is accepted medical practice to know of the
risk.255 Further, the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the undisclosed risk
materialized in harm.256
Accepted medical practice does not demand unlimited knowledge
from physicians. The duty to disclose, however, was expanded re-
cently to include disclosure of a lack of medical knowledge.257 A
physician who discovers that a patient's problem is beyond his capac-
ity to treat has a duty to disclose this fact and advise the patient of
alternative treatment.2 58
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently expressed its concern
over the confusion about the theoretical boundaries of battery and
negligent nondisclosure actions.25') In Kohoutek v. Hafner,2(-60 the
court attempted to delineate these boundries. In Kohoutek, the plain-
tiff was admitted to undergo a cesarean section delivery. Her physi-
cians induced labor with the drug Pitocin and allowed her to deliver
vaginally. Delivery proved difficult and the baby was born lifeless.
The baby was resuscitated, but suffered significant brain damage.
The plaintiff sued alleging battery, negligent nondisclosure, and
negligent treatment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court2 6 1 and
granted a new trial.2 62 The court stated that although this was not a
classic battery claim, the injection of a drug into a patient without her
consent could constitute battery.263
Second, the court of appeals stated that informed consent requires
more than a signature on a consent form. The fact that the patient
did not object to the treatment, once it began, was not sufficient to
show that consent was implied or informed.264
254. 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983).
255. Id. at 96.
256. Id. The remaining elements may be established without expert testimony.
Id.
257. See, e.g., Lane v. Skyline Fam. Med. Center, 363 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (discussing a physician's duty to advise patient of need to see a specialist).
258. Id. at 323; see also Larsen v. Yelle, 310 Minn. 521, 246 N.W.2d 841 (1976)
(physician obligated to disclose own inability to treat patient's specific condition).
259. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
260. Id. at 299.
261. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 366 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
262. Id. at 635-36.
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Finally, the court noted that informed consent requires an esti-
mate of the significance of the risk as well as the frequency of the
risk.265 In Kohoutek, the small risk of injury was magnified by other
known factors.266
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the court of
appeals. 2 6 7 The supreme court reasoned that a battery consists of an
unpermitted touching, and that the touching is allowed when the pa-
tient consents to it. However, consent is not void simply because the
patient was not touched exactly in the way he consented. Inadequate
disclosure thus does not vitiate consent, giving rise to a battery
action.
The current view focuses on two types of inquiry. In a battery ac-
tion, the medical procedure must be substantially different than that
to which the patient consented. The focus of the inquiry is whether
the physician, in fact, told the patient about the nature and character
of the procedure to which the patient consented. In contrast, in a
negligent nondisclosure action, the focus is on whether the physician
should have informed the patient of the risks of the procedure.
VI. ANALYSIS
Consideration of the proper standard for materiality and causation
must recall the values underlying the doctrine of informed consent.
The doctrine is noted in the ideals of self-determination and individ-
ual autonomy within the medical decision-making process. 268 These
values appear to address a single party - the patient. The key term,
however, within the phrase "decision-making process" is the word
process.2 69 Although the patient must ultimately decide whether to
forego or undergo treatment, the process involves two parties, the
patient and physician.270 The appropriate standard, therefore, must
account for both the patient's goals and the physician's ability to
meet the standard.
Once the cause of action for negligent nondisclosure reaches the
litigation stage, a third presence becomes important. This is the role
of the court. The courts play a primary role in shaping the informed
265. Id. at 639.
266. Id. There was a 1.7 percent risk of injury. Id.
267. Kohoutek, 383 N.W.2d at 299. At the close of the evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury on issues of negligent treatment and negligent nondisclosure.
The trial court refused to give an instruction on battery. A special verdict form asked
the jury whether the conduct of each defendant amounted to malpractice. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of all defendants and the trial court denied the plaintiff's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
Id.
268. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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consent doctrine.271 Courts exist to decide concrete controversies
and to set workable standards.272 The appropriate standard for dis-
closure must also consider the court's ability to implement the goals
underlying the doctrine of informed consent.
The cause of action for negligent nondisclosue challenges courts
with three unique concerns. These include the nature of the cause of
action,273 the nature of the injury,274 and the role of hindsight.275
First, courts see a limited view of medical practice.2 76 Without ex-
ception, informed consent cases involve medical procedures with un-
satisfactory results. Any bond between patient and physician has
been severed in favor of litigation. The judicial perspective, there-
fore, focuses on cases with perceived bad outcomes. This perspec-
tive contrasts with that of the health care professional who sees good
as well as bad outcomes.
Second, courts only see plaintiffs with actual injuries. As causation
requires a risk to materialize, there can be no legal remedy without
bodily injury. 2 77 In addition, the expense of medical malpractice liti-
gation often precludes actions unless the injury is serious.
In analyzing an allegation of negligent nondisclosure and subse-
quent injury, courts focus on the particular procedure, risk, and in-
jury.278 The comprehensive pattern of care, discussion, and
disclosure is not at issue. The courts focus on a fraction of the whole
decision-making process.
Finally, courts must struggle with plaintiff hindsight. Informed
consent cases require more than a reconstruction of the events. A
patient's informational needs must be determined at the time of the
decision-making process. An appropriate standard must respect the
plaintiff's personal convictions without succumbing to the benefits of
hindsight.
Minnesota's position, a modified objective standard of disclosure,
addresses the goals of the three parties in the informed consent
arena. The Minnesota courts have repeatedly affirmed their com-
mittment to patient autonomy. 27 9 In addition, the courts have rec-
ognized the legitimate needs of physicians.280 In adopting an
objective standard of disclosure in Cornfeldt I, the Minnesota
Supreme Court weighed the needs of both patients and physi-
271. 1 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 24.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 25.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 26,
276. Id. at 25.
277. Id. at 26.
278. Id.
279. See Corntfeldt II, 295 N.W.2d at 640 n.2; Cornfeldt , 262 N.W.2d at 702.
280. Cornfeldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 702.
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cians.28' The court's expressed goal was "to make a rational deci-
sion by the patient possible without imposing unreasonable
requirements on physicians."
Under Cornfeldt I, the disclosure duty is two-fold.282 First, a physi-
cian must disclose that which would have been disclosed under ac-
cepted medical practices.283 This is the professional standard.2
8 4
This duty is also the accepted negligence standard for medical mal-
practice litigation.285 Second, a physician must disclose risks which a
reasonable person in the patient's position would find significant in
formulating his decision to consent to treatment. 2 86 This is the ob-
jective or reasonable patient standard.28 7 This duty is not unique.
Traditional negligence tenets are based upon the reasonable per-
son. 28 8 The reasonable patient is the correlative representative in
the negligent nondisclosure context.
28 -
The modified objective standard of disclosure is a hybrid290 of the
the professional and objective standards. The practical effect, how-
ever, is that the objective element swallows the professional commu-
nity element. The factual setting of Kinikin2l.I accents the merging of
the standards. In Kinikin, the plaintiff's physician was aware of the
patient's cancer phobia.292 The Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that when a physician is aware of a particular patient's needs, he
must discuss risks significant to these needs even though these needs
are not generally considered by the medical profession. This duty is
in addition to, not in place of, the disclosure required by accepted
medical practice. In determining whether risks are of particular im-
portance to the patient and whether his physician should have been
aware of their importance, the jury evaluates what the reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position would consider significant.
The reasonable patient will always seek information disclosed by
accepted medical practices. Where such disclosure is minimal, how-
ever, the physician must disclose additional facts significant to the
reasonable patient. Thus, the objective standard will always encom-
pass risks disclosed under accepted medical practice as a baseline.
The use of this hybrid standard is unnecessarily confusing. This is
281. Id.
282. See Cornfeldt L 262 N.W.2d at 702.
283. Corn/eldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 702.
284. See supra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
285. See Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 296 (1970).
286. Cornfeldt 1, 262 N.W.2d at 702; Comfeldt I, 295 N.W.2d at 640.
287. See supra notes 112-139 and accompanying text.
288. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 83, § 32, at 173.
289. Id. at 191.
290. See Cornfeldl 1, 262 N.W.2d at 702; see also LeBlang, supra note 8, at 285.
291. 305 N.W.2d at 589.
292. Id. at 595.
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particularly evident in the area of jury instructions. Where the two
standards are presented to a jury, there is great opportunity for con-
fusion and inconsistent verdicts. The dual standard may offer an ad-
ditional obstacle for the physician. This result, however, defeats the
goal of clarity for a disclosure standard.
An objective standard best meets the goals of the three parties in
the informed consent arena. This is true in both the materiality and
causation prongs of informed consent actions. The cause of action
for negligent nondisclosure is grounded in tort priciples of negli-
gence. 29 3 It is well settled that traditional negligence tenets are
based on the reasonable person. -94 Courts are well accustomed to
utilizing the reasonable person standard in other tort actions.
The objective standard also balances patient and physician needs.
Based upon the reasonable patient, it is the societal standard of dis-
closure.295 This standard imposes a broader duty on the physician
than does the professional standard. Risks are measured in material
or absolute terms. The objective standard, however, mitigates the
physician's onerous burden under the subjective standard296 to pro-
vide maximum disclosure to avoid liability. The perils of hindsight
are similarly minimized by considering both patient and physician
roles in the decision-making process.
The patient's role is also affected by the objective standard. The
patient should be an active participant in the decision-making pro-
cess. While this meets the goals of informed consent, this standard
places a greater burden on patients with special needs.29 7 This ap-
proach requires greater public -awareness of health care.
The objective standard is not perfect. One can only speculate
whether a jury will adhere to the standard ignoring the plaintiff's
special circumstances. Additionally, when addressing causation is-
sues, a jury is frequently confronted with a severely injured plaintiff.
These problems will not disappear under any standard. Where mul-
tiple interests are involved, the proper standard addresses all inter-
ests. The objective standard best weighs and balances the
competing interests involved in the medical decision-making
process.
VII. INFORMED CONSENT AND THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT
The nature of the decision-making process changes dramatically
when the patient is unable to participate due to diminished capacity.
293. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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In these cases, the physician is unable to assess the level of informa-
tion needed to meet the patient's needs. The patient's family often
must act on the patient's behalf to provide consent for medical treat-
ment. Such situations often involve the decision whether to continue
or terminate care of critically or terminally ill patients.298
The threat of civil liability and criminal prosecution understanda-
bly creates anxiety in health care providers.29' Physicians are com-
pelled to obtain a patient's consent for any medical intervention and
are liable if they fail to obtain it. Although patients may be unable to
exercise their right to demand disclosure, the right is not extin-
guished.300 Courts have extended the doctrine of informed consent
to the incompetent as well as the competent patient.301 In such
cases, a different mechanism to ascertain and implement the pa-
tient's consent must be utilized.302 The mechanism may be a prior
expression of the patient's wishes while competent, or, if no such
expression was made, judgment may be substituted.303
The first case to involve the courts in such a decision was In re
Quinlan.304 The New Jersey Supreme Court found the unwritten
constitutional right of privacy "broad enough to encompass a pa-
tient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circum-
stances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions."305
298. See D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 59 (1981)
("The subject of death and care for the dying patient is inextricably intertwined with
the legal concept of informed consent.")
299. Byrne, Deciding for the Legally Incompetent: A View from the Bench, in LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 25 (1982);
see also Annas, Elizabeth Bouvia: Whose Space Is this Anyway? 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
24, 25 (Apr. 1986) (discussing right of competent terminally ill patient to stop
treatment).
300. See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984) (probate court al-
lowed to decide whether termination of treatment in patient's best interest); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (family may make
treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent daughter); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d
431, 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1980) (right to refuse treatment not extinguished
by incompetency).
301. Leach v. Akron General Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 4, 426 N.E.2d 809,
813 (Com.P1. 1980) (citing Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 464, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 536).
302. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 666 (discussing parens patriae responsibility
to protect incompetents); Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 5, 426 N.E.2d at 815 (parens patliae
concept of substituted judgement).
303. See supra note 301.
304. 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
305. 70 N.J. at 37, 355 A.2d at 663. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). The United States Supreme Court
has not yet addressed this question. SeeJ. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITI-
CALLY ILL, A.C.L.U. HANDBOOK 99 (1983).
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The court held that a substituted judgment could be asserted on
behalf of the incompetent Ms. Quinlan.306 This right of privacy,
however, is not automatic and must be weighed against competing
state interests.307 The New Jersey court stated that an inverse rela-
tionship exists between the state's interests and the individual's right
to privacy: "[t]he State's interest contra weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims."308
A. Minnesota Law
In 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted with the
termination of life support issue in In re Torres. 3 0 9 The court elected
to follow the lead of other states by holding that Minnesota courts
have the power to authorize a conservator to request termination of
life support systems. 3 10 The court's decision was based on several
sources of law.3l1 These included the Minnesota guardianship stat-
306. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38, 355 A.2d at 664-66. The court explained:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative exist-
ence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her
right to privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded soley
on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of choice.
The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the
guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment, . . . as to
whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is
in the affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the over-
whelming majority of whose members would, we think, in similar circum-
stances exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or those
closest to them.
Id. at 38, 355 A.2d at 664.
307. Id.
308. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38, 355 A.2d at 664; see also Price v. Sheppard, 239
N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1976). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that when
balancing state interests and an individual's right to privacy, the balance turns on the
"impact of the decision on the life of the individual." Id. The court further held that
electroshock therapy prescribed for an involuntarily committed patient did not vio-
late his right to privacy, but went on to adopt a procedure for future cases which
require a court order authorizing the treatment. Id. at 911-12.
309. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
310. Jurisdictions which had already considered this issue "uniformally upheld the
right to refuse life sustaining treatment and the authority of their trial courts to order
the removal of an incompetent's life supports at the request of the incompetent's
guardian or conservator." Id. at 339 (citing Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center,
Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980): John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984), q/f:g. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Supt. of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647: In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E. 2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied. 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809; In re Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983)).
311. Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339, 340.
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ute,3 12 the Minnesota Constitution,313 Minnesota's Uniform Declara-
tory Judgments Act,:314 the Patients' Bill of Rights,315 the
constitutional right of privacy,316 and the common law right to be
free from invasions of one's bodily integrity.317
The Minnesota court noted that the state legislature has "recog-
nized that a patient's 'best interests' may not be served by continuing
medical treatment."318 Moreover, the court implicitly recognized
that evidence indicating an incompetent patient's prior intent is rele-
vant to its determination.319
The Torres court held that, under the facts of the case, a court or-
der was necessary prior to termination of life support.32 0 However,
the court stated, in a footnote, that judicial intervention was not nec-
essary in all cases. 3 2 1 The court did not clearly state what facts ne-
cessitate judicial intervention.322
B. Use of Advance Directives for Health Care Decisionmaking
Some commentators have suggested that the use of advance direc-
tives may best effectuate a patient's intent.323 An advance directive
312. Minnesota law provides:
The duties and powers .. .which the court may grant to a conservator of
the person include, but are not limited to: .. .(4)(a) The power to give any
necessary consent to enable the ward or conservatee to receive necessary
medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service, except
that no guardian or conservator may give consent for psychosurgery, elec-
troshock, sterilization or experimental treatment of any kind unless the pro-
cedure is first approved by order of the court as provided in this clause.
MINN. STAT. § 525.56, subd. 3 (1984).
313. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 11, which requires that "original jurisdiction in law
and equity for . . . all guardianship and incompetency proceedings. shall be
provided by law."
314. Minnesota Statutes section 555.12 affords "relief from uncertainty and inse-
curity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations. MINN. STAT.
§ 555.12 (1984).
315. MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (1984), which guarantees the right of patients to "par-
ticipate in the planning of their health care." Id., subd. 10, and the right "to refuse
treatment." Id., subd. 12. This statute also allows any guardian, conservator, or in-
terested person to enforce these rights on behalf of the patient. Id., subd. 1.
316. Tones, 357 N.W.2d at 339.
317. Id.
318. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 144.651, subd. 12 (Supp. 1983)).
319. See Ton'es, 357 N.W.2d at 341.
320. Id.
321. id. at 341 n.4. Three justices disagreed, however, and indicated in special
concurrences that they believed a court procedure is always necessary. Id. at 341.
322. See id. Several states have attempted to circumvent this uncertain state of
events by enactment of "living will" statutes. See 1 HEALTHi CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 4, at 156.
323. See generally Blumer..Idvanced Directives in .Medical Decisions, 43 BENCH & B. II.
15 (1986) (discussing use of durable power of attorney for health care decision mak-
ing); 3 HEALTH CARE )ECISIONS, supra note 3, at 136.
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may provide instructions or designate an individual to consent on
the patient's behalf in the event of incompetency.324 Minnesota law
does not expressly provide for advanced directives in health care ex-
cept to the extent that a competent person may nominate a guardian
or conservator in advance of appointment.325
The Quinlan and Torres decisions indicate that advance directives
might be given effect absent a statute authorizing their use. :326 These
courts specifically held that incompetent patients retain the right to
refuse treatment by virtue of their right to privacy.3 27 The incompe-
tent's proxy, a court, guardian, or conservator, must ascertain what
the patient would have wanted if he was able to assess his situa-
tion.328 Therefore, a court could properly consider an advanced di-
rective absent express statutory authorization.329
CONCLUSION
Patients undergoing medical treatment need adequate information
to make knowing and intelligent decisions about their health care.
The doctrine of informed consent developed to insure that this need
324. Id.
325. See MINN. STAT. § 525.544 (1984).
326. See Tones, 357 N.W.2d at 341; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38, 355 A.2d at 664.
327. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 37, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
328. Id. The court concluded that "Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on
her behalf. . . by her guardian. . . inder the peculiar circumstances here present."
Id.; see also Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339-40.
329. Living will statutes have met with criticism. In one author's opinion, right-to-
die legislation is unnecessary because common law principles of informed consent
and accepted standards of good medical practice seem sufficient. D. MEYERS, supra
note 297, at 502. Another author argues that living wills are a legal convenience and
make judges' lives easier, but, in truth, many patients change their minds. He states:
Many people say that if they ever got cancer they would want to jump off a
mountain and die. The fact is that patients, when they actually have cancer,
rarely feel that way. A lot of patients who may say something at one point in
their lives feel very differently when the situation actually occurs.
Van Scoy-Mosher, An Oncologisls Ca'se foir .Vo-Code Orders. in LEGAl. AND ETHICAL As-
PECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AN) TERMINALLY II.L PATIrENTS 15, 17 (1982).
Another author credits living wills with stimulating discussion and serving as a
symbol of people's unwillingness to have their lives unreasonably prolonged, but ar-
gues that statutory language is unsuitable for defining appropriate responses to sen-
sitive and unanticipated sittations in which people die. Bayley, ll'hio Should Decide?, in
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATIN; CRITICAILY AND TERMINALLY 11.L PATIENTS
11 (1982). Bayley suggests other legislative options such as: redefining the point of
death at the moment when cognition is irretrievably lost: redefining homicide, i.e., 
. ..blanket exemption from criminal charges of medical professionals who withdraw
treatment from a noncognitive patient"; authorizing physician and/or family discre-
tion in making treatment decisions; and mandating hospital ethics committees. Id. c
Minnesota has not adopted a living will statute. Bishop, The Living Will in .Ilille-
solo, 43 BENCH & B. 17 (1986). Attempts to pass such legislation have failed thus far.
See id. at 22.
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for information is met. The doctrine recognizes that every person
has the right to decide what will be done to his body. Yet, the doc-
tine has exceptions recognizing that informed consent may not al-
ways be consistent with the best medical care.
The current controversy relates to the standard utilized to mea-
sure what must be disclosed. At one extreme, the physician is given
discretion consistent with accepted medical practices to decide what
must be disclosed. At the other extreme, the individual patient de-
cides how much information is necessary to meet his own particular
needs. A middle ground, the reasonable patient or objective stan-
dard, places emphasis on what the reasonable person in the patient's
position would want to know.
Refinement of the standards should be a judicial goal in informed
consent cases. In the future, as technology expands, the issues will
become more complex requiring set standards to decide informed
consent cases. The dilemma of informed consent for incompetent
patients will continue to exist until judicial and legislative law ade-
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